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Abstract
This paper uses rm level panel data of on-the-job training to estimate its impact on
productivity and wages. To this end, we apply and extend the control function approach
for estimating production functions, which allows us to correct for the endogeneity of
input factors and training. We nd that the productivity premium of a trained worker
is substantially higher compared to the wage premium. Our results are consistent with
recent theories that explain work related training by imperfect competition in the labor
market.
JEL codes: J24, J31, D24
Keywords: Training, production functions, human capital.
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1 Introduction
The accumulation of human capital plays an important role in explaining economic per-
formance and long-term growth (Lucas 1988). Mostly the focus lies on skill acquisition
through the general education system. However, on-the-job training plays a crucial role as
well because it can not only maintain, but also improve human capital of the workforce.
While there exists a vast literature estimating the returns to training, which focused
mainly on the impact on wages1, there are only a few papers that also analyzed the
impact of training on productivity.2 Moreover, the focus in these papers is either on the
impact on wages or on the productivity premium of training. In contrast, this paper an-
alyzes the impact of on-the-job training on both wages and productivity, which matters
for understanding the economic mechanisms behind training.
The theoretical foundations of on-the-job training have originally been formalized
by Becker (1964) who made a distinction between general and specic training. Under
1Using employee level datasets, large and signicant e¤ects of work related training on
wages are usually found ranging between 1.1% and 16.6%. Notable examples include Al-
tonji and Spletzer (1991), Lynch (1992), Loewenstein and Spletzer (1999), Parent (1999)
and Frazis and Loewenstein (2005) for the U.S and for Europe, Booth (1991), Pischke
(2001), Booth, Francesconi and Zoega (2003) and Booth and Bryan (2005) among others.
For an overview see Bassanini et al. (2007).
2These papers report mixed results but are only based on limited samples (Bartel
1995, Black and Lynch 2001, Zwick 2006). Moreover, they do not analyze wage and
productivity premia together. An exception is Dearden, Reed and Van Reenen (2006),
analyzing the link between training, wages and productivity at the sector level using a
panel of British industries.
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perfect competition, rms will not pay for general training of their workers as they can
leave the rm searching for better paid work, which compensates them for the increased
productivity acquired through general training. Hence, the worker is the sole recipient
of general training benets and will also bear the costs of it. Yet, in a series of papers
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a, 1999b) argue that a substantial amount of training
is paid for by rms and is still general in nature. They show that a necessary condition for
rms to pay for general training is a compressed wage structure, caused by imperfections
in the labor market such as monopsony. With a compressed wage structure, training
increases the marginal product of labor more than the wage, which creates incentives for
the rm to invest in general training.
Our paper contributes to the literature along various dimensions. First, we make
use of a large rm level longitudinal data set which contains information on measures of
training, such as the proportion of workers that received training, the number of hours
they were trained and the cost of training. This data allows us to measure the impact
of training on both wages and productivity at the rm level. By focusing on rm level
data we are able to avoid possible aggregation biases and hence capture the e¤ects of
training more precisely.3 Second, the analysis at the rm level and the panel structure
of the data allows us to control for the endogeneity of training. To this end, we estimate
production functions applying recent control function approaches taking into account
training decisions. In addition, the production function estimates provide us with a
measure of unobserved worker ability which we include in the wage equation to retrieve
a consistent estimate for the impact of training on wages as in Frazer (2001). Third,
3Because we use rm level data on training, we do not capture spillovers in human
capital across rms as opposed to Dearden et al. (2006).
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our data allows us to explore how the impact of training on wages and productivity is
a¤ected by worker heterogeneity related to the type of worker contracts, human capital
and gender.
We nd that an increase in the share of trained workers by 10 percentage points is
associated with 1:7 percent to 3:2 percent higher productivity, depending on the speci-
cation. However, consistent with the theoretical insights about wage compression and
training, this increase in productivity is not entirely o¤set by a similar increase in wages.
The average wage per worker only increases by 1:0 to 1:7 percent in response to the same
increase in training.
In the next two sections we develop our empirical framework and estimation strategy.
Section 4 introduces the data. We report our results in Section 5, including a battery
of robustness checks both in terms of the empirical specication and estimation method.
Section 6 distinguishes between rm specic and general training and Section 7 concludes.
2 Empirical Framework
We infer the impact of on-the-job training on both wages and productivity by applying a
framework similar to Hellerstein, Neumark and Troske (1999), which has been commonly
used to compare returns to characteristics of the labor force such as gender, race and
human capital on both wages and productivity. The idea is essentially to estimate both
a production function and wage equation to infer productivity and wage premia for the
di¤erent labor force characteristics. In competitive labor markets, the wage premium
associated with each worker characteristic should equal the corresponding productivity
premium. As it is not possible to observe the individual contributions of workers to
output, some aggregation of employee and output data is necessary, as reported in rm
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or plant level data. We depart from the standard framework of Hellerstein et al. (1999)
and allow for continuous worker characteristics (Frazer 2001, Van Biesebroeck 2011). We
next outline our empirical approach to infer the impact on productivity and on wages. A
more detailed description is given in Appendix A.
2.1 Impact of training on productivity
The output of a rm i in period t is a function of capital and a labor quality aggregate
used by the rm in period t. As is common in the literature, we assume that this function
takes the Cobb-Douglas form:
Yit = bLlitKkit exp(qit) exp("it) (1)
where Yit represents value added, bLit is aggregate e¤ective labor input, Kit is capital
and qit represents technical e¢ ciency shifting the production function. Suppose for the
moment that workers can be distinguished according to their education and training level.
If these characteristics enter the e¤ective labor input as in a Mincer (1974) wage equation,
the labor aggregate at the rm level can be written as ln bLit = lnLit+TT it+SSit+Zit
(cf. Appendix A). Here, T it represents the average training intensity of the workforce
employed in rm i during period t. Likewise Sit represents the average schooling level
of the workforce and Zit is unobserved labor quality. The parameters T and S are the
productivity premia associated with training and schooling respectively. The production
function can subsequently be written as follows:4
4Throughout the rest of the paper, lower case letters represent variables expressed in
logarithms.
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yit = 0 + kkit + llit + lTT it + lSSit + !it + "it (2)
When training and schooling are discrete variables, the average schooling and training
levels are just equal to the proportions of trained and schooled workers, LT=L and LS=L;
in the labor force and the estimation equation is exactly the same as the one derived by
Hellerstein et al. (1999). Unobserved productivity !it includes both technological progress
and unobserved labor quality. Our main parameter of interest is T , which measures how
the labor aggregate varies with training intensity (@ ln bL=@T = T ) and reects the
impact of training on the marginal product of a worker. If training intensity is dened
as a discrete characteristic the parameter reects the productivity premium of a trained
worker compared to an untrained worker. The impact of training on output depends as
well on the importance of labor in the production technology, i.e. @y=@T = lT which
represents the percentage changes in output in response to variations in the training
intensity of the workforce.
2.2 Impact of training on wages
Applying a similar derivation as for the labor aggregate in the production function, Ap-
pendix A shows how the logarithm of the average wage, wit, paid by rm i in period t
can be written as:
wit = w0 + TT it + SSit + 0Zit (3)
where again T it and Sit represent the average training and schooling level respectively.
Unobserved labor quality is represented by Zit. Similar to Hellerstein et al. (1999)
we add industry and year e¤ects to the estimation equation as well as observed rm
characteristics Xit such as the capital-labor ratio and an additive i.i.d. error term "i: The
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equation that will be estimated is the following:
wit = w0 + TT it + SSit +Xit + 0Zit + "it (4)
The parameters T and S measure how wages change in response to training and
schooling respectively and can be compared with the impact of these human capital
measures on the marginal product of workers, T and S. When worker characteristics
are discrete, the Hellerstein et al. (1999) framework leads to an identical estimation
equation as in (4). Applying OLS to the above equations (2) and (4) could result in
biased estimates of the wage premia since the human capital variables are likely to be
correlated with unobserved labor quality. We will show in the next section how we will
obtain consistent estimates for the parameters.
3 Estimation strategy
To identify the di¤erential impact of training on both wages and productivity, we need to
consistently estimate the coe¢ cients of both the production function and the wage equa-
tion. First we describe how we estimate the production function, next we show how these
estimates help us to identify the training impact. Recall the production function derived
in the previous section and assume for simplicity that workers are only distinguished by
one discrete observable characteristic, namely training:
yit = 0 + kkit + llit + tr
LT;it
Lit
+ !it + "it (5)
where tr is dened as tr  lT . As is well known since the work by Marschak and
Andrews (1944), the input choices of a prot maximizing rm are likely to be correlated
with unobserved productivity !it. To control for this we apply the estimation proce-
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dure proposed by Ackerberg, Caves and Frazer (2006) using the insight that optimal
input choices hold information about unobserved productivity. More precisely we rely on
material demand,
mit = ft

!it; lit;
LT;it
Lit
; kit

(6)
where we assume labor input and training to be set before the choice of material input.
If material demand conditional on labor, capital and training  is monotonically in-
creasing in productivity, the function can be inverted and productivity can be expressed
as a function of observables. Substituting this inverted material demand function in the
production function, results in the rst stage regression equation:
yit = llit + tr
LT;it
Lit
+ kkit + f
 1
t

mit; lit;
LT;it
Lit
; kit

+ "it (7)
We run regression equation (7) using a polynomial in materials, labor, capital and training
to proxy the inverse material input function f 1(:) and retrieve an estimate for expected
output it = llit + tr(LT;it=Lit) + kkit + f
 1
t (:). The input coe¢ cients, l, k and
tr will be identied in the second stage. An important advantage of this procedure,
given our research question and the peculiarities of the Belgian labor market, is that it
is consistent with labor choices having dynamic implications due to for example hiring,
ring or training costs. Although labor and capital will depend on lagged labor in this
case, optimal material demand mit will only be a function of lit; LT;it=Lit and kit as it
is only relevant for production in period t. However, there cannot exist unobservables
that directly a¤ect material demand since they would make the inversion of the material
demand function invalid. Moreover, the identication strategy rests on the assumption
that materials are chosen at the same time production takes place. Given the large
heterogeneity across sectors in the materials used, we will perform a robustness check on
a subsample of sectors that are more likely to purchase readily available inputs.
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The second stage of the estimation procedure serves to identify all the input coe¢ -
cients. As is standard in the literature we assume !it to follow a rst order Markov process
and we can write !it = gt(!it 1)+it where it represents a productivity shock unexpected
in period t  1. After the rst stage we can compute productivity !it for every candidate
vector of input coe¢ cients  = (l; k; tr) and non-parametrically regressing !it () on
!it 1 () allows us to recover the productivity shock it (). We can now use our timing
assumptions to form the moment conditions used to identify the input coe¢ cients. First,
we keep the standard assumption about capital accumulation, namely that investment
decided in period t only enters the capital stock in period t+1. Consequently the capital
stock in period t will be uncorrelated with the unexpected productivity shock in period
t. Moreover, we assume that labor input and the amount of training do not depend on
the innovation in productivity. For the labor coe¢ cient, this is a more strict assump-
tion than usually applied but can be justied by the substantial labor adjustment costs
in Belgium.5 We report as well results where we relax this assumption and use lagged
values of labor instead of current labor to construct the moment conditions. Concerning
the training variable, several human resource managers conrmed that the amount of
training provided to workers is mostly decided one year in advance when making up the
budget for the following year, which makes the amount of training independent from the
innovation in productivity, it (). Consequently, the moment conditions to identify the
5For example, the OECD Employment Protection Legislation Index shows the im-
portance of substantial adjustment costs for a large number of countries among which
Belgium has one of the highest scores, especially for the notice and severance pay for indi-
vidual dismissals, legislation concerning collective dismissals and temporary employment
(OECD 2007).
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input coe¢ cients in the second stage are
E
26666664it
0BBBBBB@
kit
lit
LT;it=Lit
1CCCCCCA
37777775 = 0 (8)
and we bring the sample analogue of these moment conditions as close as possible to zero
by adjusting the input coe¢ cients.
Estimating the wage equation (4) by OLS could result as well in biased estimates of
the wage premia since training is likely to be correlated with unobserved labor quality
Zit. To control for unobserved labor quality we can use our estimate for !it from the
production function. If the main component of !it after controlling for industry and year
specic e¤ects, is labor quality (so !it = !j+!t+Zit), then adding estimated total factor
productivity to the wage equation will result in the following equation to be estimated:
wit = w0 + TT it +Xit + 

0Zit + !j + !t + "it (9)
and the estimation of the equation renders consistent estimates of the wage premia. If
the estimate for total factor productivity from the production function includes as well
other factors than labor quality, !it imperfectly controls for labor quality in the wage
equation. Consequently, our measures for the wage premia could still be upward biased.
However, note that this bias works against our main conclusion that the productivity
premium exceeds the wage premium.6
We test each time for the equality of the productivity and wage premia. Only under
the joint assumptions of general training and perfect competition in the labor market, the
training coe¢ cient in the wage equation will be equal to productivity premium obtained
6More details on the estimation strategy are provided in Appendix A.
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from the production function. If equality is rejected and training is  as we argue 
general in nature, the underlying assumption of competitive spot labor markets can be
discarded. Consequently, the coe¢ cient on the training variable in the wage equation
cannot be interpreted any more as the wage premium of an individual trained worker,
reecting its productivity premium. For example, with monopsonistic labor markets, the
coe¢ cient on training is likely to be a mix of the training premium at the individual
level and parameters from the labor supply process. The coe¢ cient however can still
be interpreted in a reduced form way as the increase in the wage bill in response to an
increase in training.
All regressions include year and industry dummies. Industry dummies are at the
NACE 2 digit level for estimations on the whole sample and at the NACE 4 digit level for
regressions at the sector level. Standard errors for all coe¢ cients in both the production
function and wage equation are obtained by using a block bootstrap procedure with 500
replications.
4 Data Description
Data is obtained from the Belrst database. This database, commercialized by Bu-
reau Van Dijck, includes the income statements of all Belgian incorporated rms. We
obtained an unbalanced panel for the period 1997-2006 of both manufacturing and non-
manufacturing rms with at least one worker. We select a number of key variables needed
for estimation of the production function and wage equation such as value added, number
of employees (in full time equivalents), labor costs, material costs and the capital stock.
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In addition, Belgian rms are required to report information about formal training7 they
provide to their employees. In particular, they have to report the number of employees
that followed some kind of formal training as well as the hours spent on this training and
the training costs. This allows us to obtain a rm-level measure of training for more than
135; 000 Belgian rms active in manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors. However,
only a fraction of these rms have to report material costs, which we will need in our
empirical strategy.8 A more elaborate discussion of the dataset is included in Appendix
B.
Table 1 provides some summary statistics of the full dataset as well as of the restricted
sample of rms reporting material costs. A Belgian rm active in the private sector
employs on average 21:6 employees, generates around 1:3 million euros value added per
year and has an average labor cost of around 35; 400 euro. Manufacturing rms are on
average larger compared to non-manufacturing rms.9 The average proportion of trained
workers is equal to 3:2%, mainly due to the low number of rms providing training
to their employees. In rms that train their workers in a given period, around 50%
7Formal training excludes training that takes place at the work oor or self study. The
training has to take place at a separate training room or work oor especially developed
for training activities. Training can take place inside or outside the rm.
8Only large rms in Belgium have to submit a full version of the annual report. Smaller
rms only have to submit a shorter version which does not include material costs. Firms
are dened to be large if they have on average more than 50 employees, realize a turnover
of more than 7.3 million euro or report a total value of assets of more than 3.65 million
euro.
9Manufacturing rms are rms active in NACE Rev. 1.1 sectors 15 to 36. The other
sectors are pooled together as non-manufacturing sectors.
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of the employees benet from this training which lasts approximately one work week,
namely 39:1 hours and costs 1; 414 e to the rm. The training duration and costs are
somewhat larger in the manufacturing sector compared to the non-manufacturing sector.
We report as well the summary statistics for the subsample of rms reporting material
costs as we need to observe material costs to control for the endogeneity of inputs. The
subsample consists of typically larger rms which are more likely to provide training to
their employees. The costs and duration of training however, are approximately the same
as in the full sample. The data appendix shows more summary statistics on sector level
heterogeneity in training.
5 Results
This section presents the results of the empirical analysis. First, we estimate productivity
and wage premia for all sectors pooled together. We show moreover that these ndings
are robust to distinguishing between blue and white collar workers and hold at the sector
level as well. Next we measure training as a continuous variable. Finally we perform a
number of further robustness checks.
5.1 General Results
Baseline Results
Table 2 shows the results of estimating equations (5) and (9) for all rms active in all
sectors pooled together and for manufacturing and non-manufacturing separately. The
rst column for each subsample (total, manufacturing and non-manufacturing) reports
the estimation results for the full sample by applying ordinary least squares (OLS1).
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Our estimation strategy to control for the endogeneity of inputs requires a measure for
materials input, which is only observed for a subsample of rms. To adequately assess
the performance of our estimation strategy, we report in the second column results for
least squares estimation (OLS2) on this subset of rms. The third column presents the
coe¢ cient estimates obtained by following the estimation strategy outlined in Section 3.
The estimates reported in column (1) show that training has a statistically signicant
and positive e¤ect on productivity. The coe¢ cients imply that a 10 percentage point
increase in the proportion of trained workers is associated with 4:6% rise in value added.
Turning to the subset of rms that report material costs, the coe¢ cient on training
in the production function drops somewhat to 0:315 but remains highly signicant.10
Controlling for the endogeneity of inputs (and training) causes the training coe¢ cient
to drop further to 0:243 as shown in column (3). The estimates imply that value added
increases by 2.4% in response to an increase of 10 percentage points of the share of
trained workers such that even after controlling for the possible endogeneity of training,
there remains a substantially large impact of training on productivity. Note that the
results imply that on average the marginal product of a trained worker is around 32%
(T = :243=:764) higher than the marginal product of an untrained worker. One has to
bear in mind that this is an estimate for the average e¤ect of training on the marginal
product of all workers pooled over all sectors.11 The results for manufacturing industries
and non-manufacturing separately are comparable, although we nd a slightly stronger
10The decrease in the estimated training premium is due to large rms being more
productive compared to small rms and being more likely to train their workers as well
(cf. Appendix B).
11Moreover, when there exist spillover e¤ects to untrained workers within a rm, our
measure includes these e¤ects and the direct impact of training will be lower.
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impact of training in non-manufacturing sectors.
For the wage equation, we estimate as well three specications. First, the log wage is
regressed on the share of trained workers together with year and sector dummies (OLS1).
Second, this exercise is repeated, but the sample is now restricted to rms included in
the productivity estimation sample where we control for the endogeneity of inputs. As a
result, the coe¢ cient on training drops from 0.438 to 0.200. Note that although the OLS
point estimates for the productivity and wage premia are likely to be biased upwards
due to unobserved labor quality, the bias would a¤ect the estimated training coe¢ cients
to a similar extent in both the production function and wage equation. Consequently,
the test for equality of the premia, discussed below, remains informative. In the third
specication, we add controls in the wage equation. In particular, we add the capital-
labor ratio and total factor productivity as control variables, as discussed in Section 3.
The coe¢ cient on training further drops to 0:167, implying the wage premium for a
trained worker in the Belgian private sector to be equal to 17%.
Table 2 shows that the productivity premium of training is larger than the wage pre-
mium and the di¤erence is statistically signicant as indicated by the Wald test of the
equality of T and T .
12 The productivity premium for a trained worker is almost twice
as high as his wage premium for all sectors pooled together in column (3). With a 2-
square statistic of 128.2, the null of equal coe¢ cients can be rejected at any conventional
signicance level. The same is true for the manufacturing sector and non-manufacturing
sector separately with Chi-square values of 14.1 and 113.0 respectively. The nding that
12To retrieve an estimate for T , we divide the coe¢ cient on the share of trained workers
by the labor coe¢ cient. Consequently, the null is (tr=l)   T = 0. This non-linear
hypothesis is tested by using a Wald test.
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the impact of training on productivity is higher than the impact on wages, gives support
to the Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a,b) model that explains why rms invest in the
general training of their employees. A necessary condition is that productivity of employ-
ees increases more than their wages in response to training.13 In the last three columns
of Table 2, we relax the assumption that contemporaneous labor is uncorrelated with the
unexpected shock in productivity and use lags of the labor variable as instruments for
each subsample. As can be seen from the table, the results remain qualitatively the same.
Blue and White Collar Workers
There could be concerns that our methodology does not fully control for worker het-
erogeneity and our training coe¢ cient is driven by di¤erences in the marginal product
between di¤erent types of workers. As such, the di¤erential impact of training on wages
and productivity could reect wage-productivity gaps of these characteristics. One impor-
tant dimension of worker heterogeneity is the distinction between blue collar and white
collar workers. These di¤erent contract types can pick up di¤erences in education levels
across employees. Moreover employment protection in Belgium di¤ers between blue and
white collar workers.14 We bring in this extra information in our empirical framework by
13Note that Becker (1964) also allows for the possibility that rms pay (part of) the
training costs. For this to be the case, the training needs to be rm specic in nature.
We will turn back to this issue in the last subsection.
14For the whole sample, around 52% of the workforce is blue-collar, 44% white collar
and 1.4% management. In the manufacturing sector the shares are respectively 66%, 31%
and 1.6% and in the services sectors respectively 45%, 51% and 1.3%. The percentages
do not sum up to 100% because some of the workers have an undened contract and can
not be classied.
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including two di¤erent labor aggregates in the Cobb-Douglas production function, one
for blue collar workers and one for white collar workers.
Yit = AitK
k
it
cLBbitdLWWit (10)
with cLB and dLW the labor aggregate for blue and white collar workers respectively.
Assuming the share of trained workers is constant across the di¤erent types of contact,
the equation that we seek to estimate becomes:
yit = kkit + b(lB)it + w(lW )it + (bTB + wTW )
LT;it
Lit
+ !it + it (11)
where TB and TW represent the productivity premium of a trained blue collar worker
and the productivity premium of a trained white collar worker respectively. These pre-
mia are measured relative to an untrained worker with the same type of contract. The
drawback of this specication is that we have to exclude all observations without blue or
white collar workers. We do not include managers as a separate category as only a small
fraction of rms reports information on the number of managers, for those that do, we
simply add them to the number of white-collar workers. For the same reason we choose
not to relax the assumption of perfect substitutability between trained and untrained
employees. While it is theoretically possible to allow for imperfect substitution between
trained and untrained employees, we would be forced to drop most of the observations
since a large fraction of the rms does not provide training.
We estimate equation (11) applying our estimation strategy outlined in section 3, but
we use a di¤erent timing assumption. In Belgium, white collar workers are well pro-
tected against dismissal while blue collar workers face less strict employment protection
legislation. Consequently we treat here blue collar workers as an input that is adjusted
in reaction to unexpected productivity shocks. To control for this we use blue collar
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workers lagged one period as an instrument instead of the contemporaneous stock of blue
collar workers. Results are reported in Table 3. If we assume the impact of training
on productivity is the same for blue and white collar workers, the estimated coe¢ cient
implies a productivity premium of 22:8% and a wage premium of 13:0%. These estimates
are slightly lower compared to the baseline results in Table 2, but still show substantial
returns to training both in terms of productivity as in terms of wages. The di¤erence
between the two premia remains highly signicant with a 2-square statistic of 16.0 such
that we can reject the equality of the productivity and wage premia at each conventional
signicance level. In section 5.4, we perform some additional robustness checks related to
worker heterogeneity.
The estimated wage premium falls within the range, albeit at the higher end, of wage
premia found in other studies. These studies mostly use employee level data and premia go
from 4 to 16 percent. Concerning the impact on productivity, Dearden et al. (2006), using
industry level data, nd that an increase of 1% in their training measure is associated
with an increase in value added per hour of about 0.6% implying productivity premia
of over 60% and an increase in the average wage of about 0.3%, substantially larger
than our estimates. However, note that the median training duration in their sample is
around 2 weeks, twice as long as in the current sample, such that the productivity and
wage premium of an hour of training are more comparable. The remaining di¤erence
could be due to the di¤erent level of aggregation.
Sector Heterogeneity
So far, we assumed the same production technologies as well as training e¤ects across the
di¤erent sectors. In contrast to previous studies we can relax this assumption and allow
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for sector heterogeneity in our coe¢ cient estimates. In Tables 4 and 5 we report results
for each NACE 2 digit sector separately. For brevity, we only report the e¤ect of training
on wages and workers marginal product together with the 2 statistic and p value of the
Wald test for testing the equality of the productivity and wage premia. The coe¢ cients
on the other regressors are reported in Appendix C. For the majority of sectors, both
the labor and training coe¢ cients go down in the production function and wage equation
when controlling for their possible endogeneity. The unweighted average for the coe¢ cient
controlling for the endogeneity of training equals 0:177 in the production function15
and 0:121 in the wage equation. For 29 out of 33 sectors the impact of training on
the marginal product of workers is higher than the impact on wages.16 Focusing on the
manufacturing industries, largest productivity gains from training can be found in the
Chemicals sector and Rubber and Plastic Sector.17 For the non-manufacturing sector,
15This implies the productivity premium for a trained worker T to be equal to :243.
16For the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors, respectively 14 out of 17 and
15 out of 16 sectors report a higher productivity than wage premium. Due to the rel-
atively low number of observations in combination with the non-linear search over the
parameters, the di¤erence is however not signicant for several sectors. Applying the
ACF procedure, the di¤erence is signicant at the 10% level for only 10 sectors (out of
29 for which the productivity premium exceeds the wage premium). When the wage
premium exceeds the productivity premium the di¤erence is never signicant. For the
OLS results, the di¤erence is signicant at the 10% level for 18 out of 27 sectors for which
the productivity premium is larger than the wage premium. When the wage premium
exceeds the productivity premium, the di¤erence is never signicant.
17There are also large gains in the sector of Wood Products, but the training and labor
coe¢ cient are estimated imprecise.
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the largest productivity gains can be found in the Agriculture, Financial Intermediation
and Real Estate sectors. Figure 1 combines the estimates for the wage and productivity
premia. The 45 line is plotted, such that all observations above this line represent
sectors for which the impact of training on productivity is larger than the impact of
training on wages. Most of the sectors are located above this line which is consistent
with Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a,b).18 The correlation between the productivity
and wage premium equals 0.64 and is highly signicant.
Acemoglu and Pischke (1998, 1999a,b) show that rms will pay for general training
when the internal wage structure is compressed, meaning that the wage function increases
less steeply in general skills than the marginal product. Wage compression can be caused
by a variety of labor market frictions, such as search costs and informational asymmetries
leading to monopsony power. Ideally, we would like to relate our sector level estimates for
the wedge between the productivity and wage premium of trained workers to a measure
for monopsony power at the sector level. A positive correlation would support the view
that our nding of a positive wedge between the wage and productivity premium can be
best explained by a combination of general training and a compressed wage structure.
18The sectors that drop below the line, namely 14 Mining, 21 Paper Products
and 32 Radio, TV and Telecom. Equipment are all small sectors and we believe the
low productivity premium in comparison with the wage premium is more likely due
to ine¢ cient estimates. The di¤erence between the wage premium and productivity
premium for these sectors is never statistically signicant at any conventional condence
level. The fourth sector that drops below the line, 28 Metal Products, is large however,
but the productivity premium is close to the wage premium and the di¤erence between
the two is statistically insignicant.
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Unfortunately, direct measures for such labor market frictions do not exist at the sector
level and the estimation of monopsony power is a rather involved task, lying outside the
scope of this paper.19 As an alternative, albeit far from ideal, we relate the wedge with
inter-industry wage di¤erentials. These are estimated controlling for variables mainly
a¤ecting general human capital such as education and age, but not for training. The
idea is that sectors where workers are earning less than implied by their general human
capital, so sectors with low inter-industry wage premia, are more monopsonistic and
hence workers are less able to capture the quasi-rents of their general human capital,
an argument also used by Dearden et al. (2006). Hence, we would expect a negative
correlation between our estimated wedges and the inter-industry wage premia if training
is general in nature. When training would be specic in nature, one would not expect
the wedge to be related to the inter-industry wage premia. Using the estimates of Du
Caju et al. (2010) for inter-industry wage premia in Belgium, we nd that the average
(median) gap between the productivity and wage premia is equal to 0.063 (0.050) in
sectors for which the inter-industry wage premium is positive while the average (median)
gap is equal to 0.131 (0.116) in sectors with a negative inter-industry wage premium. This
tentative evidence is open to the critique that for example rm-specic training may be
more prevalent in the sectors with low inter-industry wage premia. We come back to the
di¤erence between rm specic and general training in Section 6.
19For example, Manning (2003, 2011) suggests to infer the elasticity of the labor supply
curve to an individual rm by estimating the wage elasticities of separations to employ-
ment and non-employment, so requiring worker-level data as well as exegonous variation
in the wage rate.
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5.2 Training Hours
In Table 6 we redene the training variable as average training hours per employee and es-
timate equations (2) and (4) to determine the impact of training intensity on productivity
and wages respectively. Again results are reported for the whole sample and manufac-
turing and non-manufacturing separately. We control for the possible endogeneity of
training in both the production and wage equation, applying our estimation strategy de-
scribed above. We estimate the productivity premium of an hour of training to be equal
to 0:0076, which means that each hour of training raises the marginal product of a worker
by 0:76%. The wage premium of an hour of training is estimated to be 0:44% and the
di¤erence between the wage and productivity premium is again highly signicant. The
results imply that the marginal product of a trained worker receiving the average amount
of training hours (36.7 hours) is 27:9% higher than the marginal product of an untrained
worker while its wage is only 16:1% higher, in line with the results of the previous section.
Also for the manufacturing and non-manufacturing sectors separately, the productivity
premium is higher than the wage premium. A summary of the results for sector spe-
cic estimates are reported in the last columns of Table 6.20 Again productivity premia
surpass wage premia for the majority of sectors. The correlation between the impact on
productivity and on wages equals 0:49 and is highly signicant.
5.3 Robustness Checks: Measurement and Estimation
The nding of substantial productivity and wage premia for trained workers where the
former are larger than the latter, passes a number of robustness checks. For brevity we
20In Appendix E, we graphically represent productivity and wage premia for the dif-
ferent sectors.
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only report the wage and productivity premia as well as the test of their equality. Table
7 reports a number of robustness checks with respect to the measurement of training
and the estimation method used. First, we constructed a measure for the training stock
using the perpetual inventory method, i.e. Sit = (1   it)Sit 1 + Fit where Sit is the
training stock of rm i in period t and Fit represents the training ow. Every period, the
training stock depreciates at a rate of it which consists of two components, namely the
share of trained workers that leaves the rm every period and the rate at which acquired
knowledge through training becomes obsolete. We approximate the rst component by
the observed rm level separation rate. Unfortunately we do not have information about
the second component but we check the robustness of our results for di¤erent values of it
(more details are provided in Appendix D). The results are reported in the rst rows of
Table 7. The contemporaneous impact of training on productivity and wages is estimated
to be lower compared to the specications using training ows.21 The di¤erence between
the wage and productivity premia remains largely signicant.
Second, the Ackerberg et al. (2006) methodology relies on the assumption that ma-
terial input is fully exible and that material input choices are made contemporaneously
with output choices. For some sectors this assumption seems appropriate while in other
sectors material orders may require substantial advance time. To identify sectors that are
more likely to purchase readily available materials we combine the classication by Rauch
(1999) with Supply and Use tables to distinguish between sectors using mainly homoge-
21This is in line with expectations. Although an increase in the stock of human capital
due to training increases the contemporaneous marginal product by less, training has lin-
gering e¤ects and the marginal product of a trained worker remains high in the following
periods.
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neous and reference priced products and sectors using mainly di¤erentiated products as
inputs.22 The idea is that homogeneous and reference priced input quantities are more
easily adjustable compared to input demand for di¤erentiated products as the latter have
characteristics that vary across suppliers and may even be tailored to the buyers needs
(Besedes and Prusa, 2006). Finding new suppliers of di¤erentiated products is more
likely to involve higher search costs and to require buyer-supplier specic investments.
Consequently, contract and transaction duration is likely to be longer for di¤erentiated
products compared to homogeneous and reference priced products. For example, in the
international trade literature Besedes and Prusa (2006) nd that di¤erentiated products
are traded longer than reference priced and homogeneous products. We estimate our main
equation for the subset of industries using primarily homogeneous and reference priced
inputs and results are reported in Table 7, second row. Again, training results in both
positive productivity and wage premia and the former are larger than the latter.
Finally, we executed a number of additional estimation approaches. We estimate Equa-
tions (5) and (4) with Zellners seemingly unrelated regression (SUR) estimator.23 More-
over, we use the average wage at a rm as a control for unobserved worker ability and
nally, we include training lagged one period instead of contemporaneous training as an
instrument as there could be concerns that training intensity does depend on the innova-
tion in productivity. For example, in the case of an unexpected economic downturn rms
could send their employees more easily on training since the opportunity cost of training
is lower which would create a downward bias in the estimated training coe¢ cient. For
all these robustness checks, our results remained qualitatively the same as shown in the
22More details on the the precise classication procedure are given in Appendix B.2.
23In the SUR estimation we do not try to control for the endogeneity of inputs.
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last three rows of Table 7.24
5.4 Robustness Checks: Worker Heterogeneity
In Section 5.1 we made already a distinction between blue and white collar workers
and assumed them to be imperfectly substitutable. In this subsection, we include other
measures for worker heterogeneity, but we take the assumption that these are perfectly
substitutable in order to be able to use the full data set. First we include measures for
the education level of the labor force, second we control for the gender composition of
the workforce.
Ideally we would be able to distinguish between high and low educated workers and
observe the proportion of trained workers within each type. This would allow us to control
for the education level of the workers and estimate di¤erent training premia for di¤erent
types of workers. Unfortunately this information is not available, so we experimented
with two di¤erent approximations to the skill level of the labor force. First, we observe
the education level of every employee that leaves or enters the rm in a given year and
we take the average education level of the inow and outow over all years as a proxy
for the education level of the total labor force. We dene a worker to be high-educated
if he received higher or university education and low-educated if he received at most
primary or secondary school education. Second, we make a distinction between blue
collar workers, white collar workers and managers. We insert the shares of the di¤erent
24We also estimated our main specications using the Blundell and Bond (1998) system-
GMM estimator exploiting various lag structures of the endogenous variables as instru-
ments. While our point estimates remain robust, the Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions rejects the validity of the instruments.
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types of workers in the production function and wage equation (cf. Equations 2 and 4)
and apply again our methodology to control for the endogeneity of inputs.25 The rst part
of Table 8 reports results when we control only for schooling. In the second set of results
we control only for the type of contract and the third part of the table shows results
of including both schooling and type of contract. More detailed results are included
in Appendix G. Both the wage and productivity premium of training go down when
controlling for the educational level and types of contracts. The productivity premium
however is always estimated to be larger than the wage premium and the di¤erence is
statistically signicant. For example, including both the type of contract and schooling
level, lowers the wage premium to 9:8% and the productivity premium to 16:8%, which
is more in line with results from previous studies.
Besides blue and white collar workers we observe as well the number of male and
female employees. Given previous ndings on productivity-wage di¤erentials between
women and men (Hellerstein and Neumark, 1999), we check the robustness of our results
to the inclusion of the share of female employees. Results are reported in the nal part
of Table 8. By way of comparison with Table 2, it is clear that controlling for the share
of male/female workers does not modify the training coe¢ cient estimate. Appendix
G reports as well results for assuming the di¤erent types of workers to be imperfectly
substitutable. Again, the main results did not change.
25We allow for the di¤erent contract type shares as well as the share of schooled workers
to be endogenous.
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6 Firm specic versus general training
In the previous sections, we have established a positive and statistically signicant impact
of training on productivity. Moreover the productivity premium was found to be larger
than the wage premium. Note that this gap between the productivity and wage premium
for trained employees can be explained equally well by perfect competition and rm
specic training as by imperfect competition and general training. Each explanation
however implies radically di¤erent policy implications. Which of the two theories is the
best explanation for our results?
The most direct test would be looking at whether the acquired skills are transferable
to other employers. For example Booth and Bryan (2005) nd the wage premium of
training received at previous employers is larger compared to the premium received for
training at the current employer in the UK. Not only is this result a clear indication
that most training is general in nature, but it also gives support to theories explaining
rm provided training by labor market imperfections. Loewenstein and Spletzer (1998)
nd comparable results for the US. Unfortunately, we can not test directly for general
versus rm specic training as we do not have employee level data about training at the
current versus previous employer. However, note that our training measure represents
formal training, which is more likely to be general in nature. Moreover, we attempt to
infer from the turnover rates whether training is most likely to be general or specic in
nature.
Under both rm specic training and general training rms are less likely to dismiss
trained workers. Firm specic training is also likely to be negatively related to workers
quit rates but general training is less likely to reduce quit rates. The reason is the
following. Both rm specic training and perfect competition as well as general training
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and imperfect competition create a gap between the workerswage and marginal product,
making trained workers more protable for the rm. Training costs are sunk and hence
rms are less likely to re trained workers. For workers, rm specic and general training
can have a di¤erential impact on their probability to quit the rm. Under rm specic
training, acquired skills are not applicable in other rms, creating a gap between the
wage of a trained worker at the current rm and the outside wage.26 Consequently the
probability of a voluntary quit should be lower. When training is general in nature
however, it is possible that training does not have an impact on quit rates of workers. For
example, when the presence of unions is the main source of wage compression, trained
workers could earn the same wage at other rms leaving the quit rate una¤ected at
training rms. Moreover, poaching of trained workers by other rms could even increase
the probability of a voluntary quit.
Our dataset allows us not only to compute general separation rates, but also to dis-
tinguish between whether these separations are dismissals initiated by the rm or quits
initiated by the worker. When we regress the quit and dismissal rates on the share of
trained workers lagged one and two periods, we nd that dismissal rates are negatively
and signicantly a¤ected by the lagged share of trained employees27 as can be seen from
26Note that in principle, the rm can leave the wage of trained workers unchanged
after training under rm specic training as the outside option for the worker has not
changed. However, Becker (1964) and Hashimoto (1981) noted that it can be optimal
for both workers and rms to share benets of training, namely under the form of higher
wages but still lower than the marginal product, lowering the probability a worker quits
the rm.
27We control not only for rm xed e¤ects but include also inows of employees both
contemporaneous and lagged one period and year dummies to control for business cycles.
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Table 9 . Quit rates however seem to be una¤ected by the number of trained workers.
The coe¢ cient on the lagged share of trained employees is not signicantly di¤erent from
zero. The share of trained employees lagged two periods has even a positive and sig-
nicant impact on the quit rates.28 Our results are consistent with the few papers in
the training literature relating job turnover to training. Lynch (1991) nds that young
workers are less likely to leave the rm if they have received on-the-job training while
workers that participated in o¤-the-job training are more likely to leave the rm. She
takes this as an indication that on-the-job training is more rm specic and o¤-the-job
training is more general. However, Parent (1999) uses the same dataset and estimates
both o¤-the-job and on-the-job training to have a negative e¤ect on the probability of
separation. Bassanini et al. (2007) estimate the relationship between voluntary quits and
training for some European countries, including Belgium, and do not nd an impact of
past training spells on turnover. Although not a formal proof, these results suggest that
the training is most likely to be general in nature instead of rm specic and combined
with our estimates of the return of training on wages and productivity give support to the
theoretical work by Acemoglu and Pischke (1998) explaining training by imperfections in
the labor market.
7 Conclusions
This paper used a large rm level panel data set to analyze the impact of rm provided
training on both wages and productivity. We are able to measure for each rm the
28When aggregating training and separation rates at the 4 digit level, there was a
substantial and signicantly negative correlation between the dismissal rate and the share
of trained employees but not between the quit rate and share of trained employees.
30
amount of employees that received some kind of formal training as well as the training
costs and the hours spent on training for the period 1997 to 2006. We use a control
function approach to estimate production functions and wage equations at the rm level
to infer productivity and wage premia of training, taking explicitly the endogeneity of
training into account.
Our results indicate that the productivity increase associated with training is larger
than the wage increase. More precisely, e¤ective labor input increases by 1:7% to 3:2%
in response to an increase of 10 percentage points in the fraction of workers that receive
training while the average wage increases by only 1% to 1:7%. This di¤erence between
the productivity premium and the wage premium is statistically signicant and robust
across a wide range of specications. We nd a slightly higher impact of training in non-
manufacturing compared to manufacturing sectors. Our results are robust across di¤erent
specications and denitions of the training variable. In particular, we take into account
various measurement issues, estimation methods and sources of worker heterogeneity.
We provide initial evidence that the majority of training is general in nature and
hence our results are consistent with recent theories such as Acemoglu and Pischke (1998,
1999a,b) which explain rm provided general training by imperfect competition in the
labor market and wage compression. This nding can have important policy implications.
The standard result of Becker (1964) is that if workers are not credit constrained, training
investments are e¢ cient and government intervention is unnecessary or should be directed
to the credit markets. However, with imperfect labor markets and a compressed wage
structure, there could be underinvestment in training from a social point of view. For
example, when making their training decisions, rms do not take into account the pos-
sible externalities for future employers of trained workers (Acemoglu and Pischke 1998,
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1999a,b). This opens possibilities for the government to implement training subsidies.
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Table 3: Blue versus White Collar Workers, Imperfect Substitution
OLS ACF
Prod. Wage Prod. Wage
Capital .163* .113*
(.005) (.005)
Blue Collar .295* .275*
(.006) (.049)
White Collar .448* .452*
(.011) (.011)
Training T or T .297* .163* .228* .130*
(.016) (.004) (.022) (.008)
Nr. Obs. 46,052 46,052
Nr. Clust. 8,753 8,753
Test for T = T
Chi2 78.7 16.0
p  value .000 .000
Results ACF method blue collar workers lagged
one period as instrument. Standard errors are
computed using a block bootstrap procedure
with 500 replications and are robust against het-
eroskedasticity and intra-group correlation. * Sig-
nicant at 5%.
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Table 6: Training as Average Training Hours per Worker
Total Manuf. Non-Manuf. Each Sector Separat.
Production Function
Labor .770* .794* .756* T
(.008) (.016) (.009) Min -.0015
Capital .089* .131* .082* Max .0168
(.004) (.001) (.004) Av. .0059
Training Hours .0058* .0047* .0065*
(.0003) (.0004) (.0004)
T .0076* .0058* .0087*
(.0004) (.0005) (.0005)
Wage Equation
Training Hours(T ) .0044* .0044* .0046* T
(.0002) (.0003) (.0003) Min -.0008
ln(K/L) -.015* .018* -.022* Max .0099
(.002) (.004) (.002) Av. .0032
TFP .340* .311* .346*
(.006) (.009) (.007)
Wald Test T = T
21 86.0 7.1 69.2
p  value .000 .008 .000
47
ACF procedure to estimate wage equation and production function. Standard
errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure with 500 replications
and are robust against heteroskedasticity and intra-group correlation.* Signif-
icant at 5%.
48
Table 7: Results Further Robustness Checks
Prod. Wage Test for Equality T = T
T T 
2
1 p  value
Training Stock .181* .090* 136.0 .000
(.009) (.003)
Fully Flexible Materials .263* .180* 7.58 .006
(.029) (.016)
Wage as Control .250* .168* 261.4 .000
(.014) (.006)
SUR Model .391* .208* 593.8 .000
(.008) (.005)
Lagged Training .224* .147* 30.3 .000
(.015) (.007)
Di¤erent robustness checks. First, training intensity is measured
by the training stock. Second, results for the subsample of sectors
using reference priced or homogenous goods are reported. Third,
we use wage as a control variable for labor quality in the production
function. Fourth, we apply Zellners SUR estimator and fth, we
use training lagged one period as instrument. * Signicant at 5%.
49
Table 8: Worker Heterogeneity, Perfect Substitution
OLS ACF
Prod. Wage Prod. Wage
Schooling (T or T ) .255* .112* .189* .094*
(.016) (.005) (.012) (.013)
Wald Test T = T
21 (p  value) 161.4 (.000) 18.1 (.000)
Type of Contract (T or T ) .273* .155* .222* .139*
(.012) (.005) (.013) (.006)
Wald Test T = T
21 (p  value) 123.4 (.000) 45.3 (.000)
Type of Contract and Schooling (T or T ) .211* .112* .168* .098*
(.011) (.005) (.012) (.008)
Wald Test T = T
21 (p  value) 99.7 (.000) 24.6 (.000)
Female/Male Employees (T or T ) .417* .199* .301* .164*
(.014) (.006) (.013) (.007)
Wald Test T = T
21 (p  value) 360.7 (.000) 129.6 (.000)
Results of controlling for di¤erent types of worker heterogeneity. Full sam-
ple pooled. Standard errors are computed using a block bootstrap procedure
with 500 replications and are robust against heteroskedasticity and intra-group
correlation. * Signicant at 5%.
50
Table 9: Separation rates and training
FE one lag FE two lags
Dismissals Quits Dismissals Quits
Train. Sharet-1 -.00254y -.00132 -.0028y -.0023
(.0015) (.0024) (.0015) (.00241)
Train. Sharet-2 .00174 .00627*
(.00149) (.00237)
Nr. Obs 76,359 76,359 76,340 76,340
Firm and year xed e¤ects as well as the inow of employ-
ees both contemporaneous and lagged one period included. y
Signicant at 10%. * Signicant at 5%.
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Figures
Figure 1: Impact Training on Productivity and Wages
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